: La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement économique chinois by Fabre, Guilhem
The Lion’s Share. What’s behind China’s economic
slowdown
Guilhem Fabre
To cite this version:
Guilhem Fabre. : La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement e´conomique chinois. FMSH-
WP-2013-53. 2013. <halshs-00874077>
HAL Id: halshs-00874077
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00874077
Submitted on 17 Oct 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-53
Working Papers Series
The Lion’s Share. 
What’s behind China’s economic slowdown
Guilhem Fabre
N°53 | octobre 2013
Following the global crisis, the stimulus package of 
2009-2010, with its huge expansion of credit, marked 
the end of « Cheap China », with the underpricing 
of labor, capital, land, energy and currency, and 
disproportionally shifted growth in favor of the public 
sector and real estate, the lion’s share of the State-
Party system. The present process of deleveraging 
must adress the unprecedented inequities which 
stem from distortions in the allocations of resources 
and the respective functions of the central and local 
governments.
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Abstract
Following the global crisis, the stimulus package of 2009-2010, with its huge expansion of credit, marked 
the end of « Cheap China », with the underpricing of labor, capital, land, energy and currency, and 
disproportionally shifted growth in favor of the public sector and real estate, the lion’s share of the State-
Party system. The present process of deleveraging must adress the unprecedented inequities which stem 
from distortions in the allocations of resources and the respective functions of the central and local 
governments.
Keywords
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La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement 
économique chinois
Résumé
Le plan de relance qui a suivi la crise globale, en 2009-2010, avec une expansion considérable du crédit, 
a marqué la fin de la « Chine bon marché », avec la sous-évaluation du travail, du capital, du terrain, de 
l’énergie, et de la monnaie, tout en déséquilibrant fortement la croissance au profit du secteur public et 
de l’immobilier, la part du lion de l’État-Parti. Le processus actuel de désendettement doit régler les pro-
blèmes d’inégalités majeures qui dérivent des distorsions dans l’allocation de ressources et des fonctions 
respectives du gouvernement central et des gouvernements locaux.
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China’s economic slowdown continues to provoke wide discussion in 2013, for the third consecutive year since its occurence. This slowdown follows 
a huge expansion of credit during the stimulus 
package of 2009-2010, which led to the end of 
«  cheap China  » and disproportionately shifted 
growth in favour of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and real estate, the lion’s share of the 
state-party system. The present process of deleve-
raging must address the problem of income dis-
tribution for without some measures to deal with 
such unprecedented inequities, there can be no 
sustainable growth path. 
The end of the commodity 
supercycle
As China accounts for 40 percent of emerging 
market GDP, its slowdown has aready had large 
repercussions on commodity producers’ countries, 
especially South Africa, where exports to China 
represent close to 12 percent of GDP, Australia, 
where this ratio stands at 5 percent, or Brazil and 
Russia, where it is around 2 percent1.
China accounts for 12 percent of global demand 
for commodities, 60 to 70 percent for iron ore 
and soybeans, and 40 percent for copper2. As for 
crude oil, China imports 6 percent of global sup-
ply to ensure 60 percent of its consumption. It has 
represented more than 60 percent of projected oil 
demand from 2011 to 2013, and could bypass the 
U.S as the world’s largest net importer in October 
2013, according to the U.S Energy Information 
Administration3. 
China’s economic slowdown has so far had only 
a small impact on its imports, which are partly 
driven by strategic stockpiling and speculative 
tendencies4, but it is already affecting world-
wide commodity prices. Australian Prime Min-
ister Kevin Rudd said that 2013 marks the end 
1. Noah Weiberger, « China credit concerns », Top of Mind : 
Economics, Commodities, and Strategy Research, Goldman 
Sachs, August 5th 2013, p. 14.
2. Michael Pettis, cited in Business Day, Johannesburg, Au-
gust 13, 2013 in BBC Asia Pacific, 23/08/2013  ; Brendan 
Coates and Nghi Luu, « China’s emergence in global com-
modity markets » Australian Treasury, http://www.treasury.
gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/
Publications/2012/Economic%20Roundup%20Issue%201/
Downloads/01%20China%20Commodity%20demand.ashx
3. Short-Term Energy Outlook, August 9, 2013, http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12471
4. Leslie Hook, Financial Times, 10/01/2013
of the China resources boom, as the prices for 
resources and commodities have fallen by almost 
25 percent and may well fall further5. At the St 
Petersbourg International Economic Forum in 
June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Poutine 
explained the abrupt fall in Russia’s growth rate 
by the fall of prices of its main exports. 
The dramatic expansion of the Chinese econ-
omy after its membership in WTO in 2001, was 
threatened by the global crisis of 2008, which 
reduced its main export markets towards North 
America and Europe. It rebounded with the 4 
trillion yuan (US $ 575 billion) stimulus package 
at the end of 2008, which boosted infrastructure 
construction and the import of natural ressources 
and raw materials. The commodity « supercycle » 
where accelerating demand and rising commod-
ity prices stimulated growth in at least three of 
the five BRICS countries that are commod-
ity exporters (Brazil, Russia and South Africa), 
reached its peak in 2011, with copper prices six 
times higher than in 2003, before dropping 30 
percent in 2013, along with iron ore6.
The analysis of the determinants of China’s 
growth is thus essential to understand its cycles of 
expansion and slowdown, which have worldwide 
repercussions. The gigantic stimulus package of 
2008, equivalent to 13 points of GDP, represented 
a forced transition from investment and export-
led growth to a model focused mainly on invest-
ment, which seeks to rebalance growth in favour 
of consumption. Following the global crisis, the 
evolution of capital formation and investment is 
crucial to China’s growth and prospects. Official 
figures show that the contribution of exports to 
GDP growth was diminishing since the begin-
ning of the global crisis, while fixed asset invest-
ment rose to extraordinary levels (48 percent of 
GDP) for four consecutive years (2009-2012), a 
trend that would have driven any other nations to 
overcapacities and crisis. 
Although capital accumulation had contributed 
around half of China’s economic growth, since 
the reforms in 1979, outweighing the contribu-
tion of total factor productivity especially since 
1993, such a high level of investment has a flip 
side in terms of low-consumption. The conver-
gence of high savings and low consumption is a 
5.  Li Jiabao, China Daily 12/07/2013.
6. Daniel Yergin, « China’s big commodity chill », Wall Street 
Journal, 8/08/2013.
The Lion’s share : What’s behind China’s economic slowdown 5/21
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-53
long-term trend of the Chinese economy since 
the economic reforms and opening policy were 
relaunched in 1992. Households’ savings have 
averaged 19 percent of GDP since then, with a 
strong increase to 22 percent at the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Corporate savings averaged 
15 percent of GDP from 1992 to 2007, but simil-
alrly rose to 22 percent by the mid 2000s. The rest 
of the savings stem from government with a rate 
of around 5 percent of GDP since 1992, which 
more than doubled in the 2000’s to 10.8 of GDP 
in 2007. All told, China’s saving rate increased by 
17 points, from 38 percent of GDP in the 1990’s 
to around 52 percent of GDP by the late 2000s. 
As savings rose, households’ consumption fell as a 
share of GDP from 50 percent in the early 1990’s 
to 35 percent since 2007, while government con-
sumption varied just between 13.5 and 15-16 
percent of GDP during the same period. There 
are those, however, who contest the reality of this 
analysis7.
The black hole of official 
statistics
In 2009, the National Bureau of Statistics released 
an article by one of its experts, criticising the qual-
ity of the consumption estimates. Subsequently, 
Wang Xiaolu and Wing Thye Woo suggested 
that China’s urban households’ income might be 
undereported by 66 percent. Unidentified « gray 
income » totaled 6.2 trillion yuan, or 12 percent 
of GDP. Of the undereported income, 63 percent 
went to the wealthiest 10 percent households, 
which is really 65 times higher than that of the 
poorest 10 percent, and not 23 times indicated 
by official data. Households’ income inequality 
is certainly much higher than suggested by the 
reported Gini coefficient (0.47). Secondly, expen-
diture on housing, if the housing is for own use is 
not entirely for investment, and rental equivalent 
costs should be treated as consumption expen-
diture8. Zhang Jun and Zhu Tian estimate that 
housing consumption standing at 6 percent of 
7. Linda Yueh, China’s Growth : The Making of an Economic 
Superpower, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.16-17.
8. Ryan Rutkowski, Peterson Institute of International Eco-
nomics (PIIE), August 12th, 2013 ; Xiaolu Wang and Wing 
Thye Woo, «  The Size and Distribution of Hidden Income in 
China », MIT Press Journals, Asian Economic Papers, Win-
ter/Spring 2011, Vol. 10, N°1, Pages 1-26 ; http://www.mit-
pressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ASEP_a_00064; 
Wang Xiaolu, Caixin Online, 23/09/2013 : http://english.
caixin.com/2013-09-23/100585181.html?p1 
GDP is unrealistic in view of exorbitant property 
prices, and is more likely to represent around 10 
percent of GDP. They also consider that a part 
of business costs or investment expenditures paid 
for by companies, correspond to private con-
sumption. A large share of imported luxury cars 
and other goods fall in this category9.
The same is true for the management costs of 
central and local public administrative agencies, 
an important component of government con-
sumption, which rose from less than 5 percent 
of budgeted expenditures in 1978 to 18  ,7 per-
cent in 2006. The growth of these expenses have 
increased by over 21 percent for the whole period, 
twice that of the GDP10. Beginning in 2010, and 
thereafter, before the new direction of Xi Jing-
ping/Li Keqiang decided to react by setting new 
standards for public management expenditures, 
40 percent of the turnover of the Galeries Lafay-
ette, Paris’ biggest luxury department store, was 
made by Chinese clients travelling abroad…11 
The Penn World Tables provide an adjusted esti-
mate for Chinese household consumption, in 
terms of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), by 
comparing the prices of a basket of goods in dif-
ferent countries. This adjustment raises the house-
hold consumption rate to around 44.2 percent of 
GDP, an increase of ten points, but this percen-
tage remains much lower than in other Asian 
countries (51.9 percent for Malaysia, around 53 
percent for Taïwan and Korea, nearly 60 percent 
for Thaïland, 61 percent for India and 66 percent 
for Japan). 
The PPP and the bottom-up surveys change the 
general picture of consumption in favour of the 
top decile of wealthiest households but not neces-
sarily the downward trend of households’ consump-
tion in GDP, better reflected by the share of labor 
compensation and household income in national 
income, which declined from 66.8 percent in 
1996 to 50.6 percent in 2007. This amount lost by 
wages went towards capital’s share and a depre-
ciation of state assets, as shown by Simarro12. 
9. Jun Zhang and Tian Zhu, Financial Times, 15/01/2013.
10. Michel Aglietta et Guo Bai, La voie chinoise : capitalisme 
et Empire, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2012, p. 340.
11. Personnal interview, Shanghai, november 2012.
12.  Yiping Huang and Kunyu Tao, « Causes of and Rem-
edies for the Peoples’s Republic of China’s External Imbal-
ances : The Role of Mactor Market Distortion », ADBI Work-
ing Paper Series 279, April 2011, Asian Development Bank 
Institute, p.20 ; Ryan Rutkowski, PIIE, 12/08/13 ; Ricardo 
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Whatever the rate of household consumption in 
GDP (35 percent in the official figures or around 
45 percent for the adjusted estimate), it remains 
practically identical, despite the gigantic stimulus 
package of 2008 which was supposed to rebalance 
growth in favor of consumption. To understand 
the reasons for these inefficiencies, we must first 
understand the growth dynamic before the global 
crisis of 2008. 
Pre-crisis growth or the 
height of « Cheap China »
The most convincing explanation for China’s dra-
matic growth and export performance from 2001 
to 2008 has been developped by Huang Yiping of 
Beijing University13. There is a strong asymmetry 
between trade liberalization for goods and services, 
where free markets determine the prices of more 
than 95 percent of products, and factor markets 
for labour, land, capital, energy and the environ-
ment, which remain under government control. 
The underpricing of labor, which explains partly 
the performance of labor- intensive manufactur-
ing and exports, is the result of the « household 
registration system » (hukou) which segments the 
rural and urban labour market and feeds the flows 
of migrants (mingong) uncovered by the social 
welfare system. « Were urban employers to make 
social welfare contributions for their migrant 
workers, their payrolls would rise by about 35-40 
percent 14». This impact is particularly significant 
on labor since in 2005, 46 percent of the Chi-
nese workforce was employed in the informal 
sector, and half of these workers were excluded 
from the social protection system15. According to 
a study by the Research Office of the China State 
Council, the migrants workers from the country-
side worked an average of 11 hours a day, six or 
seven days a week, or nearly 50 percent more than 
Molero Simarro, « Functionnal Distribution of Growth and 
Income and Economic Growth in the Chinese Economy », 
Department of Economics Working Papers N°168, , School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Feb-
ruary 2011. 
13. Huang Yiping (2011)
14. Huang Yiping (2011), p. 14. In 2012, according to Wang 
Xiaolu (article cited, Caixin online, 23/09/2013) only 16.9 
percent of migrants workers had medical coverage.
15. Park, A. et Cai, F. (2011), « The informalization of the 
Chinese Labor Market  », in S. Kuruvilla, C.K. Lee et M. 
Gallagher (Ed), From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization  : 
Markets, State and Workers in a Changing China, Ithaca, Cor-
nell University Press, 2011.
formal employees, but received only 60 percent of 
the pay, without counting the difference in social 
protection. Philippe Huang underlined that if one 
adds to the migrants the urban workforce in small 
private entreprises and the self-employed, the 
total employed in the informal economy comes 
to more than 60 percent of the urban workforce16.
The cost of capital has been fixed artificially low by 
the domination of four State Commercial Banks 
(ICBC, Bank of China, Construction Bank and 
Agricultural Bank), which allocate 60 percent of 
credit in China. Their managers are nominated by 
the State and they follow its priorities by lending 
to the State Owned Enterprises which get more 
than half of all bank loans and account for less 
than 30 percent of industrial output. The finan-
cial penalties induced by the spread between low 
deposit rates fixed by the People’s Bank of China 
(2 to 4 percent) which are negative in view of 
inflation, and lending rates (5,5 to 7,5 percent), 
has cost Chinese households about 255 billion 
yuan ($US 36 billion) or 4 percent of GDP in 
200817. Cheap credit given to SOEs has favoured 
a capital-intensive regime with a high investment 
rate in the priority sectors defined by the govern-
ment, to the detriment of labour- intensive Small 
and Medium Enterprises, and the private sec-
tor. In Wenzhou region, where private credit was 
authorized on an experimental basis, the lending 
rates varied between 13 and 17 percent over the 
period, 2003- 2010. The one-year interest rate to 
private credit agencies was around 20 percent18. 
Land is the main factor of production in the 
countryside and functions as a rural safety net 
for 250 million rural households. It is the prop-
erty of the State in cities, and of local authori-
ties in the countryside while user rights belong 
to the peasants, pending State approval when 
used for development purposes. Since the 1990s, 
the economic gain derived from transfering land 
use rights has been considerable, since « land and 
natural resources assets » are valued at 44.3 RMB 
trillion in 2010 (US $ 6.54 trillion at the 2010 
16. Philip C.C. Huang, « The Theoretical and Practical Im-
plications of China’s Development Experience : The Role of 
Informal Economic Practices », Modern China, Volume 37, 
Number 1, January 2011, p.23 ; On the lack of social protec-
tion for migrants, cf. Heather Xiaoquan Zhang, « Protection 
Mobile Livelihoods  : Actors’ Responses to the Emerging 
Health Challenges in Beijing and Tianjin », Modern China, 
38 (4), 2012.
17. Linda Yue, op.cit. p. 314.
18. Michel Aglietta and Guo Bai, op.cit., p. 293.
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exchange rate) while non-financial state-owned 
enterprises have a book value of 59.1 RMB tril-
lion (US $ 8.72 trillion)19. Since the mid 1990s, 
the main impetus for development shifted from 
Town and Village Enterpises (TVEs) to local 
government projects conducted in collaboration 
with outside and domestic enterprises. This trend 
must be understood in the context of the surge of 
cross-border Non Equity Modes of Production 
(NEM), as a form of governance of transnational 
corporations’ global value chain. 
UNCTAD estimates that the direct local value-
added impact of cross-border NEMs was roughly 
US $ 400-500 billion a year in 2010, with con-
tract manufacturing and services outsourcing 
accounting for more than $200 billion. China has 
served as the « world’s factory » in international 
joint production projects where it has played the 
role of assembler of manufacturing products and 
the top importer of intermediate goods. It is these 
forms of processing activities that have led to its 
trade surpluses20. 
A horizontal competition developed between ter-
ritories to «  attract businesses and investment  » 
(zhaoshang yinzi 招商引资), by providing land 
and infrastructure for industrial use below cost. 
According to official statistics, the average fees for 
the negotiated granting of land use rights, gener-
ally used for industrial projects, were only about 
30 percent of those collected through auctions, in 
2003 (1, 69 million yuan/hectare versus 5,67 mil-
lion). Despite this huge price advantage, public 
auctions accounted for 15 percent of all land leas-
ing deals in 1999, and rose to less than a third (27 
percent) in 2003, following the central govern-
ment’s policies enforcing greater transparency. 
These subsidies were granted because of the 
expected rewards in terms of growth, its multi-
plier effects on employment through services to 
enterprises, the revenues from taxes (25 percent of 
the value-added tax, 50 percent of the enterprise 
19. Yang Li, Zhang Xiaojin et al. ( June 2012), «  China’s 
Sovereign Balance Sheet and its Risk Assesment », Economic 
Research Journal, p.4-19, cited in Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy 
Chen, « China : Rising Risks of Financial Crisis », Asia Spe-
cial Report, Nomura Global Economics, Hongkong, 15 March 
2013, p. 15.
20. UNCTAD, «  Non equity modes of international pro-
duction and development  », Chapter IV, World Investment 
Report 2011  ; WTO & IDE-JETRO, Trade Patterns and 
global value chains in East Asia : From trade in goods to trade in 
tasks, 2013, p.83, 85-87, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/stat_tradepat_globvalchains_e.pdf
income tax, and 100 percent of the new sales and 
income tax , yingyeshui 营业税 and suodeshui 所得
税), and especially housing and real estate devel-
opment, the value of which tends to appreciate. 
In the Yangzi delta, for instance, local govern-
ments could sell the land to real estate developers 
at a price ranging from 4 to 14 times the aver-
age compensation paid to farmers, and the devel-
oped land could be resold at a price that was on 
average five times as high. Thus, the sale price of 
developed land could yield anywhere from 30 to 
50 times the original-land-requisition price paid 
to the peasants, thereby contributing to a rising 
share of local government revenues21.
As for energy and environment, prices of oil, gas 
and electricity have been regulated by the State, 
under the National Development and Reform 
Commission, which since the end of the 1990’s 
tried to raise low domestic prices closer to inter-
national levels. However, the strong rise in crude 
oil prices from 2000 to 2008 (where the barrel 
was close to 150 $US in 2008) led the NDRC to 
maintain the domestic price at around 80 $ US a 
barrel. Fan Gang estimates that Chinese enter-
prises pay around 660 yuans (83 dollars) less than 
foreign multinationals for the extraction of one 
ton of crude oil which means that in 2007 alone, 
the Chinese government received RMB 117,81 
billion (US $ 15,5 billion) less on crude oil produc-
tion than they would have at international prices22. 
Low domestic prices of oil, gas and electricity 
have exacerbated waste, despite environmen-
tal laws and regulations neglected at the cen-
tral and locals, to meet the clear priority of eco-
nomic growth. Pollution of air, water and land 
has reached alarming proportions to the point 
of threatening productivity and the health of 
the population. Such environmental degrada-
tion, the partial cost of which came to 3.05 per-
cent of GDP in 2004, has already affected climate 
change as evidenced by rapid melting of ice in the 
Himalayas, the accentuation of droughts in the 
North and floods in the South23.
The underpricing of factor markets is equivalent 
to a huge producer subsidy which Huang Yiping 
evaluates, from 2000 to 2008, at between 8.5 
21. Philippe Huang, (2011), p.  4, 18-19  ; Huang Yiping, 
(2011); Tao Ran, « The Issue of Land in China’s Transition 
and Urbanization », Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working 
Paper, 2012, p. 3.
22. Michel Aglietta & Guo Bai, op.cit., p.  295.
23. Huang Yiping, article cited, (2011) p. 15.
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and more than 12 percent of GDP at its peak years 
in 2006 and 2007. His main finding is that the 
underpricing of capital contributes on average of 
about 40 percent of the total subsidy to producers. 
As for labor, migrant workers’ pay grew at only 
half the rate of the national average, their pay gap 
with urban workers widened from 30 to 50 per-
cent, and their number rose from 88 million in 
2000 to 140 million in 2008. Thus, the labor cost 
distortion rose from only 0.1 percent of GDP 
in 2000 to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2008, when it 
bypassed capital to become the largest cost distor-
tion item. As this crude evaluation does not take 
into account the underdeveloped social welfare 
system, Huang Yiping suggests that it is underes-
timated. So the underpricing of labor represents 
certainly more than the average 25 percent of the 
producer subsidy linked with factor market dis-
tortions between 2004 and 2008. 
The land issue is more complex since the non-
market prices, through negotiation between users 
and local governments are generally reserved for 
industrial activities, and auctioning at market 
prices, on average six times higher than the off-
market negotiations, are reserved for real estate 
developers. But as the property boom surged 
since 2005, the differential between market and 
non market prices may be artificial and according 
to Huang Yiping, « a better approach would be 
to look at the gap between the actual rental costs 
paid by industrial firms, compared with potential 
market rates ». Between 2000 and 2008, land may 
account for approximately 10 percent of the pro-
ducer subsidy. 
The same proportion may be true for the energy 
subsidy (10 percent), in the years where it was 
significant, between 2004 and 2008. But the pro-
ducer subsidy on environmental degradation is 
more problematic, since its externalities are not 
taken up by enterprises, and the whole estima-
tion is based on the official cost of environmental 
degradation.
Thus, in the pre-global crisis years of 2000-2008, 
the extraordinary expansion of China has noth-
ing to do with a «  miracle  » and much to do 
with the underpricing of labour, capital, land and 
energy, which was equivalent to a gigantic trans-
fer of resources from workers, households, and 
partly consumers to producers (especially SOEs) 
and governments. This annuity, in the sense that 
it is not linked to efficiency, productivity, and 
innovation, but derives mainly from the capac-
ity to manipulate the allocation of the main fac-
tors of production through the command struc-
ture of the State, is basically the reward of power, 
as long as it is able to implement the conditions 
for strong economic growth, which may allevi-
ate employment constraints and favour social 
mobility, its main tool of legitimation. At the 
same time, the liberalisation of prices for goods 
and services, coupled with the underpricing of 
the factors of production and the exchange rate 
of the RMB is a powerful tool of competition 
during the 2000-2008 period, when China has 
gained privileged acces to the two main world 
markets, the U.S and Europe. The strong inter-
actions of the US finance-led growth model and 
the Chinese investment and export-led growth 
model, explain, in part, why these two countries 
were responsible for half of the world’s economic 
growth between 2002 and 2008, and why this 
growth, based on strong income inequalities, led 
to the world financial crisis24. 
Post crisis growth :  
the role of SOEs  
and local governments
Although the stimulus package, launched in late 
2008, helped China to avert a recession with 
the abrupt drop of demand for its main export 
products from North America and Europe, the 
steady growth of credit, the priority of SOEs in 
its allocation, and the way it was financed, raised 
doubts about the sustainability of the rebound in 
macro-economic growth. 
Since then, China has depended on a much fas-
ter expansion of credit to generate growth. Offi-
cial fixed asset investment jumped by 32 percent 
in 2009 alone. Total leverage, including through 
shadow banking, has risen from 150 percent of 
GDP in 2008 to an estimated 219 percent in the 
first half of 2013, an increase of 69 points of GDP, 
one of the highest shares in the world, compared 
to the U.S (+ 46 percent of GDP between 2002 
and 2007), Malaysia (+ 40 percent) or Thaïland (+ 
66 percent) before the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. 
This level of credit depends on national savings, 
and is not from foreign countries, as in Japan, 
24. G. Fabre, « The twilight of Chimerica ? China and the 
collapse of the American Model », Bernadette Andreosso-
O’Callaghan and M. Bruna Zolin, (Ed) Current Issues in 
Economic Integration, Can Asia Inspire the West ? , Farnham, 
Ashgate Publishing, 2010.
The Lion’s share : What’s behind China’s economic slowdown 9/21
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-53
where total leverage is equal to 392 percent of 
GDP. In this sense, China’s credit is manageable 
on a sovereign basis, and not subject to capital 
outflows and exit strategies by institutional inves-
tors, which accelerated the Asian crisis, or to 
interactions with global financial markets, which 
spread the U.S subprime crisis of 2007 to the rest 
of the world. 
China’s high ratio of leverage, which has grown 
18 percent year after year, twice the average 
growth of GDP, is comparable to the Eurozone 
(259 percent of GDP) or the U.S (253 percent of 
GDP), but much higher than the other BRICS 
countries (105 percent of GDP in India, 103 per-
cent in Brazil and 71 percent in Russia)25. The 
risks do not concern consumer loans (23 percent 
of GDP) or central government leverage (22 per-
cent of GDP) but the leverage of the corporate 
sector (151 percent of GDP) and of the Local 
Government Finance Vehicles (LGFV).
According to Guo Shuying, Chairman of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), 40 percent of fixed asset investment 
has gone to industry since the beginning of the 
stimulus package. None of the manufacturing 
businesses with mature technologies have had a 
shortage of production capacity while, as early as 
2009, twenty one out of twenty four industrial 
sectors had excess production capacities26. That 
may explain why the use of industrial capaci-
ties is relatively low – around 60 percent in 2011 
according to the IMF, 70 percent for traditional 
industries (steel, cement, aluminium) according 
to the the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), and around 50 percent or 
much less for equipment industries in 201327. 
In short, the stimulus package has exacerbated the 
traditional supply-based growth model, which 
assumes that new industrial capacities and infra-
structure lead automatically to demand growth28. 
The State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are a typi-
cal illustration of this logic. They dominate the 
Chinese economy under the supervision of the 
State-Party. The 117 largest SOEs in critical sec-
tors such as commodity production, construction, 
25. Goldman Sachs, Top of Mind, article cited, August 5th, 
2013 ;  Bulletin économique Chine, n°58, juillet 2013, DG Tré-
sor/Ambassade de France en Chine.
26. Renmin ribao, (Peoples Daily), July 2, 2013. 
27. Bulletin économique Chine, juillet 2013.
28. Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, « China Grows Down », 
Project Syndicate, 15 July 2013.
rail and air transportation, shipbuilding, elec-
tronics, telecommunications, coal and electric-
ity generation, oil, automobiles, and tobacco, are 
supervised by the State-Owned Assets Supervi-
sion and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
a government body directed until recently by 
Jiang Jiemin. In addition, the State Banks and 
Insurance Companies are regulated by the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 
the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) and other entities. The highest-level 
executives in the State Banks as well as the stra-
tegic SOEs are directly nominated by the Organ-
isation Department of the Chinese Communist 
Party, which is one of the main tools of the CCP’s 
top-down structure, dealing with promotion. 
SOEs which used to employ between 60 and 75 
percent of the urban population in the 1980’s 
were drastically reformed in the 1990s. Their 
number fell from 10 million in 1994 to 7.9 mil-
lion in 1997 and…165.000 in 1998. While their 
share of output has remained around 30 percent 
of GDP since then, their share of urban employ-
ment has declined to less than 10 percent, reflect-
ing their transition from labor- to capital-inten-
sive entities, as well as the end of their pivotal 
role in terms of income redistribution and social 
protection whose cost was massively transferred 
to households29. SOEs and especially the larg-
est ones under SASAC’s supervision, were the 
largest beneficiaries of the 2008 stimulus pack-
age. Total net profit of SOEs continued to rise in 
2009, to 4057, 7 RMB billion, 4.37 times that of 
2001 and 12 percent of GDP. What is more, total 
profits of the Central SOEs administered by the 
SASAC accounted for 67.5 percent of total profit 
in 2010. And only ten companies accounted for 
70 percent of all the profits made by the Central 
SOEs in 2009, including China Telecom, China 
Unicom and China Mobile, the three companies 
which shared a 900 million mobile subscribers 
market, China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC),  and Sinopec. CNPC and China 
Mobile alone accounted for more than one third 
of the profits. This impressive performance of 
SOEs is not a reflection of their return on invest-
ment, which is lower than that of the non-state 
sector (8.5 percent versus 12.9 percent) but the 
result of their market power, monopolistic or oli-
gopolistic, and of preferential state policies30.
29. Linda Yueh, op.cit. p. 308.
30. The Nature, Performance and Reform of SOE’s, Unirule In-
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First, large corporations enjoy a large profit mar-
gin through the artificially low cost of capital, 
which is linked, as we have seen, to a resource 
transfer from the households’ captive savers, 
while Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
pay higher interest rates, as they must obtain cap-
ital from the non-bank or shadow banking sys-
tem, where risk is higher. According to an IMF 
working paper, the total resource transfer by this 
two-tier financial sector depends on the size 
and spread between administrative and market 
interest rates, and the extent of credit allocated 
through the non-bank financial sector. From 
2001 to 2008, the preferential financing cost on 
loans accounted for 47 percent of total nomi-
nal profits of SOEs, while from 2001 to 2011, 
the subsidy to SOEs through the underpricing 
of capital was estimated at around 4 percent of 
GDP31, a continuation of the trend observed by 
Huang Yiping during the first decade of 2000. 
Were this bias toward SOEs redressed, China’s 
investment rate would fall by 5 percent of GDP 
without an adverse effect on economic growth32.
The subsidy on land is even larger for SOEs than 
the underpricing of capital. From 2001 to 2009, 
on the basis of industrial land rents set at 3 per-
cent of the purchase price, SOEs should have 
paid rents equal to 67.2 percent of their total 
nominal profits.
As for energy, the government takes less than 2 
percent of the price of oil in China, far below 
the 12 percent which is imposed on Joint Ven-
tures. Combined with coal, natural gas and other 
resources, the SOEs underpaid more than 8 per-
cent of their total nominal profits during the 
period from 2001 to 200933. Since they are capi-
tal-intensive, in contrast to SMEs, SOEs have the 
capacity to pay higher wages without jeopardiz-
ing their profits. In 2008, average compensation 
for their labor was 63 percent higher than that 
of private enterprises and 36 percent higher than 
that of non-state owned enterprises. In monopo-
listic industries, the average income per year of 
stitute of Economics, Beijing, http://english.unirule.org.cn/
Html/pub/20121225155225531.html
31. Il Houng Lee, Murtaza Syed and Liu Xueyuan, «  Is 
China Overs-Investing and Does it Matter », IMF Working 
Paper, WP/12/277, November 2012.
32. Dollar, D., and S.J.Wei, « Das (Wasted) Capital  : firm 
Ownership and Investment Efficiency in China  », IMF 
Working Paper 07/9, January 2007.
33. Cf. The Nature, Performance and Reform of S0E’s, note 32.
employees could even reach RMB 128.000, about 
seven times the national average. And a large 
number of SOEs and government institutions 
provided housing at low prices to their staff. 
Despite all these subsidies and huge profits, the 
contribution of SOEs to the state coffers was non 
existent between 1994 and 2007 and negligible 
afterwards (6 percent of their profits in 2009, and 
2.2 percent in 2010), whereas the tax burden of 
private enterprises was fixed at 25 percent. Most 
of their profits are reinvested or managed for 
Central SOEs by SASAC. 
Finally, a set of laws has been adopted to support 
the central SOEs in key industries. The Merger 
and Acquisition Law passed in 2003, protected 
listed or non-listed SOEs from hostile takeover, 
the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law exempted 
2100 SOEs, forcing them to close according to 
specific procedures, and according to Yueh, the 
2007 Anti-Monopoly Law, apparently neutral, 
exempted SOEs from rules limiting monopoly 
power and market concentration, on the basis of 
« public interest, a clause usually applied to so-
called strategic industries crucial for economic 
security or development  »34. In essence, SOEs 
may be viewed as the lion’s share of the State-
Party system concentrating the flows between 
power and capital, in a «  revolving door system 
of mixed loyalty »… « SOE executives enter gov-
ernment to promote policies and and orient the 
allocation of resources, while officials enter SOEs 
to pursue economic gains »35.
The reform of SOEs according to the principle 
« zhuada fangxiao » (save the large, let go of the 
small), which privatized the small and medium 
sized SOEs and created « national champions » 
was enacted in 1994, the same year as an impor-
tant fiscal recentralisation. Following an alarming 
report by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, On 
the Chinese State Capacity (1993), the Tax Sharing 
Reform, was adopted in 1994 to increase the fis-
cal revenue to GDP ratio, which rose from 12.3 
in 1993 to 20.7 in 2007.36 Before 1994, most fis-
34. Linda Yueh, op.cit., p. 311-312.
35. The Nature, Performance and Reform of SOE’s, op. cit. 
36. Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao, Shenyang, Liaoning Ren-
min chubanshe, 1993. English version : The Chinese Economy 
in Crisis  : State Capacity and Tax Reform, East Gate, 2001. 
From 2000 to 2010 the average government expenditure to 
GDP was 19.4, a relatively small share, compared to oth-
er developing economies as these figures do not take into 
account the ownership of State enterprises, Linda Yueh, 
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cal revenues (78 percent) as well as expenditures 
(71.7 percent) went to local governments. From 
1994 to at least 2010, the central government col-
lected most fiscal revenues (52.6 percent on aver-
age), while its share of expenditures compared to 
local governments was basically unchanged (27 
percent on average). 
In summary, the Tax-sharing reform of 1994 
resulted in a gigantic transfer of resources to the 
central government. Along with the reform of 
State enterprises, the creation of a strong top-
down economic structure, local governments (at 
the provincial level, prefectural, or prefectural-
city, district, township and village levels) were 
responsible for economic development and the 
provision of public services. Their total resources 
could not keep up with their financial obligations 
which included supporting retirees and laid-off 
workers from former SOEs in the 1990s. In 2012, 
local governments still accounted, on average, 
for 70 percent of local expenditures, 90 percent 
of general public service expenditures, 76 per-
cent of public security, 84 percent of education, 
68 percent of social security and employment, 
78 percent of health care, 59 percent of environ-
mental protection and 49 percent of science and 
technology37. 
This centralisation of revenue collection and 
decentralisation of expenditure responsibilities, 
led to a mismatch between revenues and expen-
ditures at the local level, partly covered by trans-
fer payments subject to government discretion, 
and mainly covered by the income of the land-
use rights transactions for a period of 40 to 70 
years38. While the 1994 Tax sharing reform cor-
responded to a fiscal re-centralisation, revenue-
sharing arrangements for land-leasing moved in 
the opposite direction. Following the generali-
sation of land-leasing as public policy and local 
practice in 1992, the State Auditing Office found 
that 80 percent of the land-leasing revenues were 
concealed from local fiscal authorities and that 90 
percent of the remaining amount was allocated 
to local discretionary budgets, instead of being 
op.cit. p. 316. 
37. CEIC, Yifan Hu, PIIE, september 3rd, 2013.
38. Feng Xiyuan, Rural Developement Institute, CASS, 
« Features, Problems and Reform of County and Township 
Fiscal Administration System in China », Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy, Working Paper, 2012 ; Weibo Xing and Joyce 
Yanyun Man, « Regional Tax Transfer and Horizontal Tax 
Assignment in China  », Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 
Working Paper, 2012.
shared (60-40 percent) between the central gov-
ernment and the local authorities. Consequently, 
the central government decided to assign all land-
leasing revenues to municipal governments, as a part 
of the 1994 tax-sharing reform. 
Urban land is not a static asset as it can be created 
or valued by converting rural areas at the urban 
fringe or delocalizing state-owned industries, 
public services or residents from the city centres. 
As local governments assumed full responsibility 
for urban construction, they soon became infra-
structure and real estate developers. Land-leasing 
was used to finance the bulk of infrastructure 
construction, the rest being borrowed from State-
Owned banks and generally secured by munici-
pally owned land. As Peterson noted, « Debt ser-
vice often is paid by selling off the leasing rights 
to parcels of land whose value has been enhanced 
by the debt-finance infrastructure projects »39. 
Clearly, there are risks associated with such land-
use development policies : if the proceeds of asset 
sales are not exclusively used for long-term infra-
structure investments, but become part of the 
municipal operating budget, local governments 
become dependent upon asset sales for covering 
their expenditures. The situation may be viable as 
long as asset prices rise, which tends to create a 
real estate bubble, but may become problematic 
when land prices go down. Since land has been 
used massively, like in Japan in the 1980’s, as a 
collateral for loans, this affects not only the fiscal 
balance of local governments that assume most of 
the public burden, but also the financial health of 
the State-Owned Banks and other financial enti-
ties. As we shall see, these risks have been exacer-
bated by the stimulus package of 2008.
Land leasing as the main 
vehicle to finance  
the stimulus package,  
and its consequences
As the bulk of the stimulus package in 2009-
2010 (around 70 percent) had to be financed by 
the state companies and local authorities, the sale 
of land-use rights became a part not only of the 
investments but also of the operating budgets of 
local governments. Land sales had long been used 
as an important tool of government intervention, 
39. George E.Peterson « Land leasing and Land Sale as an 
Infrastructure-Financing Option », World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper 4043, November 2006, p. 4-7.
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either by underpricing land for industrial proj-
ects (80-85 percent of land transfers) in a hori-
zontal competition between local governments 
which encourages overinvestment, or by pursuing 
high prices for real estate projects which generate 
short-term taxable incomes for local authorities, 
particularly for house sales, leading to high busi-
ness taxes. In the Pearl River Delta Region, often 
known as the world’s factory, local governments 
(city, district and township) even offered «  zero 
land price » in the late 1990s and early years of 2000 
to compete for industrial development projects40. 
From 2001 to 2008, the proceeds from land-
use rights represented, on average, 40.5 percent 
of local governement income, but they jumped 
to 61 percent of income during the two years of 
the stimulus package (48.8 percent in 2009 and 
74.1 percent in 2010), before remaining flat in 
2011 and 2012 at around RMB 2.9 trillion (5-6 
percent of GDP)41. This dramatic leap is linked 
to the strong injection of credit. According to 
CBRC statistics, by the end of 2009, the local 
government loan balance was RMB 7.38 trillion, 
an annual growth of 70 percent42.
The reliance on assets sales is especially risky 
because land prices are volatile. Recent research 
based on land auction sales in 35 major cities 
between 2003 and 2011 has shown that, despite 
significant heterogeneity, there is a large rever-
sion to the mean on their annual price growth (on 
the order of 35 percent). Land price volatility is 
3-5 times above house prices. Construction costs 
are flat, and construction workers’ wages grow 
strongly but with relatively low variation, so the 
volatility of housing prices is driven by the land 
market and not by other factors of production43. 
Despite skyrocketing land values in China 
between 2003 and 2011 – their average rate of 
40. Tao Ran, « The issue of Land in China’s Transition and 
Urbanization », Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, Beijing University, 2012, p.4-6. Michel Aglietta, 
op.cit. p. 296.
41. Chinese Ministry of Finance published in different 
sources  : Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekly), 14/01/2011 
for 2001-2008 ; Yongheng Deng, Joseph Gyourko and Jing 
Wu, «  Land and House Price Measurement in China  », 
Working Paper 18403, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, U.S, September 2012, p. 19, for 2010 ; China daily, 
7/01/2013, for 2011  ; Andrew Sheng, Project Syndicate, 
19/08/13, for 2012 (estimation on 11 months).
42. Lu Xiaoping, Zhang Dukang, People Net, 21/06/2010, 
cited in Feng Xiyuan, Working Paper cited, p. 40. 
43. Yongheng Deng et alli, NBER Working Paper cited, p.  4-5.
growth is above 10 percent and exceeds 20 per-
cent per annum in eleven cities, including Beijing 
(+ 20.2 percent) and Shanghai (23.7 percent)- 
the volatility of these prices was especially dra-
matic before and after the stimulus package. The 
surge in average land prices in 2007 (+ 46 per-
cent) was followed by a slump (– 5.3 percent) in 
2008, the year of the global financial crisis, and 
followed by two years of appreciation linked to 
the stimulus package    (28 percent in 2009 ; 31 
percent in 2010), and two years of pratically flat 
growth (2011 and 2012). The typical amount of 
space supplied via land auctions in a 35 city sam-
ple doubled between 2008 and 2011. However, 
in the first part of 2012, permitted square  foot-
age levels of land sold decreased by 50 percent 
in comparison to the levels prevailing in the final 
year of the stimulus, especially in the coastal areas. 
Beijing numbers declined 75 percent ; Shanghai, 
91 percent ; Fuzhou, 96 percent ; Dalian 92 per-
cent ; while Guangzhou and Xiamen had no land 
sales, with levels down 100 percent 44.
This suggests that the volatility of land prices is 
not so much due to a fall in demand by private or 
para-public developers, but to the periodic inter-
vention of the central government on land-sup-
ply, in order to restrict credit growth and overin-
vestment. In 2004, for instance, central regulation 
prohibited municipal land purchases for urban 
development, partly as a fiscal measure to restrain 
excessive local investment. The race for land 
reserves had led to the establishment of 6,015 
development zones, of which only 20 percent had 
received the requisite approval of the State Coun-
cil or provincial governments45. 
The same thing happened during the stimu-
lus package. The Local Government Financ-
ing Vehicles (LGVF) or difang zhengfu rongzi 
pingtai, created for the first fiscal stimulus plan 
after the 1998 Asian financial crisis, boomed in 
order to borrow from the banks46 as leverage was 
forbidden at the local level, and State-Owned 
Enterprises, with the aid of easier credit policies, 
invested more and more in the growing real estate 
sector. Under the SASAC administration, 70 per-
cent of SOEs were engaged in real estate opera-
tions and managed some 2,500 hotels throughout 
44. Idem, p.23.
45. George E. Peterson, Working Paper cited, (2006).
46. Yang He and Joyce Yanyun Man, « The Debt Magnitude 
and Insolvency Risk of Local Financing Platforms in China », 
Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012, p. 3.
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the country, not to mention local-level SOEs. 
More than 30 percent of fixed asset investment 
was directed, in 2010, towards the real estate sec-
tor, residential or non residential47. Since 2011, 
central government has tried to rein the credit 
growth by raising the one-year interest lending 
rate and the reserve requirements of banks from 
14 percent in 2009 to 21.5 percent in 2011, but 
the reduction of the square footage permitted to 
be sold in land auctions (- 16 percent in 2011 in 
35 major cities, confirmed in 2012) also served as 
a dissuasive tool. 
The consequences of this real estate bubble are, 
above all, social : before the stimulus package, in 
2007, a research report estimated that there were 
40 million dispossessed farmers due to urban 
expansion and infrastructure projects, and land-
related incidents were already the top-cause of 
rural grievances and protests, as the municipali-
ties’ sale price for leasing land for urban use often 
exceeded the purchase price paid to farmers by a 
factor of 10048. Yu Jianrong, a researcher on rural 
China, calculated in 2010 that the government 
had expropriated 6.7 million hectares of rural land 
over a 20 year period, paying farmers 2 trillion 
yuan (US $ 326 billion) less than market value49. 
In cities, the high price paid for land by real 
estate developers shifted to housing prices, which 
become less and less affordable for average income 
households. The ratio between the price of resi-
dential housing and the yearly average household 
income at the end of the stimulus package (2010) 
has bypassed 8, the level observed in Spain or 
the U.S at the highest level of their real estate 
booms, and even exceeds 15 in the coastal cities. 
Since 2010, more than a quarter of foreign direct 
investment in China has been directed to real 
estate, and the value of real estate assets owned 
by foreign investors in China has grown to 1.1 
trillion US $, the second regional position behind 
Japan, and about 10 percent of global real estate 
47. Cheng Li, in Hu Angang, China in 2020 : A New type of 
Superpower, Washington, Brooking Institution, 2011, p.34, 
cited by Mylène Gaulard, « Changes in the Chinese Prop-
erty Market : An indicator of the difficulties faced by local 
authorities»  ; Natacha Aveline Dubach, « Finance Capital 
Launches an Assault on Chinese Real Estate », China Per-
spectives, Special Feature  : Real Estate Speculation and its 
Social Consequences, n° 2013/ 2, CEFC, Hongkong.
48. Tao Ran, Working Paper cited, p.7-8. Peterson, Working 
Paper cited, p.8.
49. The Economist, June 1st 2013, p. 55-56.
investments50. Recent research has shown that, 
from 2004 to 2009, property prices rose by 250 
percent in 25 major Chinese cities51. Access to 
property is more and more denied to urban aver-
age-income households, except in suburban areas, 
close to the informal «50.000 urban villages » and 
«  small-property-rights  housing» where half of 
the 140-150 million migrant workers live52. 
On the other side of the social spectrum, the 
number of Chinese billionnaires in the real estate 
sector rose from 18 percent in 2008 to 27 per-
cent in 2010, which indicates the magnitude of 
wealth distribution generated by the stimulus 
package53. But apart from this strong social polar-
isation effect, (the main losers from this form of 
economic growth, -- landless peasants and low-
income urban citizens – have more difficulty in 
achieving upward mobility) the conditions of 
economic growth have changed since the 2010 
peak. 
The end of Cheap China 
and the expansion of 
shadow banking
In 2010, workers’ strikes in the giant Taiwanese 
Foxconn factory in Shenzhen, the number one 
assembler of consumer electronic products for 
well-known brands, attracted world attention 
to the labor conditions of migrants, underpaid 
and deprived of social protection. But the end of 
cheap Chinese labor really began with the stim-
ulus package, which confirmed labor shortages 
in China’s coastal areas such as the Pearl River 
Delta and the Yangzi River Delta. In addition, 
the shortages pointed to the higher education 
and qualification of workers, and the propensity 
of potential migrants to remain closer to home 
and to work off farms, sometimes in factories 
moving from coastal areas inland because of ris-
ing production costs.54 
50. Mylène Gaulard, Natacha Aveline Dubach, articles cited.
51. Yongheng Deng, Jing Wu and Hongyu Liu (2013, forth-
coming), « House Price Index Construction in the Nascent 
Housing Market : the Case of China », Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, cited in Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy 
Chen, « China, Rising Risks of Financial Crisis », Asia Spe-
cial Report, Nomura Global Economics, Hongkong, 15 March 
2013, p. 9.
52. Tao Ran, Working Paper cited, p. 13.
53. Asia Pacific Wealth Report 2010, cited by Mylène Gaulard, 
article cited, p.8.
54. In 2012, there were 160 million migrants who left their 
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In 2010 the annual wage of a Chinese urban 
worker reached 37,147 yuan (or US $ 5,487) 
about the same as in the Philipinnes and Thaï-
land55. International comparisons give a better 
idea of this catch-up phenomenon : the average 
wage in China was about twice that in Indonesia 
in 2000, but it rose to 3.5 times by 2011. From 
2000 to 2011, cumulative wage growth in China 
was 473 percent, much higher than 238 percent 
in Indonesia, 137 percent in India and 46 per-
cent in Mexico. On the currency side, from 2005 
to 2012, the RMB appreciated by 57.4 percent 
and 56.8 percent respectively, against the Indian 
rupee and the Mexican peso56. 
The stimulus package, by easing credit, appre-
ciated land prices not only as we have seen, for 
real estate projects, but also for industrial proj-
ects, especially in the largest cities of coastal areas 
where land reserves were diminishing, despite 
the constant extension of urban areas. Accord-
ing to official statistics, the average price per 
square meter of land on sale rose from RMB 573 
in 2003 to RMB 3,393 in 2012, a 492 percent 
rise over ten years57. The appreciation of land and 
labor costs led a lot of foreign as well as domestic 
enterprises to relocalise labor-intensive activites 
in inland regions. 
With the rise of land and labor prices, the credit 
effects on growth tended to diminish58, at the 
time (2011) when the central government tried 
to rein it in by raising repetedly the one year lend-
ing rate and the obligatory reserve ratio of banks. 
But these traditional tools became less and less 
efficient, with the dramatic expansion of the two-
tier financial system, or «  shadow banking  », to 
finance not only the SMEs but the Local Gov-
ernment Financing Vehicles (LGVF), which can 
no longer rely on cheap bank loans. According 
provinces and 100 million who left their local jurisdictions 
but remained within their respective provinces, which results 
in an estimate of 260 million migrants, in China, according 
to the State Statistics Bureau.
55. Hongbin Li, Lei Li, Binzhen Wu, and Yanyan Xiong, 
« The end of Cheap Chinese Labor  », Journal of Economic 
Perspectives- Vol. 26, Number 4, Fall 2012.
56. Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy Chen, 2013, article cited, No-
mura Global Economics, p. 13. 
57. Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy Chen (2013), article cited, p. 9.
58. Total Factor Productivity, which measures economic effi-
ciency, grew 4 percent from the acces of China in the WTO, 
in 2001 to 2007, but has fallen by almost half since the 
stimulus package of 2008 (Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, 
« China grows down », Project Syndicate, 15, July 2013).
to the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), shadow banking, which refers to all 
lines of credit not regulated by the same standards 
as conventional bank loans, increased from RMB 
800 billion (US $ 130 billion) in 2008 to RMB 
7.6 trillion (1.2 trillion US $) in 2012, around 15 
percent of GDP. Total off-balance-sheet activity 
in China, composed of credit to property devel-
opers (30-40 percent), LGFV (20-30 percent) 
and SMEs, individual and bridge loan borrow-
ers, is estimated at around RMB 17 trillion (US $ 
2.69 trillion), a third of GDP59.  
While regulators have been keeping control 
over risks in the banking sector, they have toler-
ated the boom in shadow banking to meet the 
financing needs of local governments and prop-
erty developers. This tolerence explains its rapid 
growth. Investors tend to believe that there is an 
implicit government guarantee, since the bor-
rowers are tied to the local governments. The 
moral hazard may aggravate financial risks and 
inequality. Since many shadow banking prod-
ucts are reserved for high net worth investors 
(the minimum subscription is usually RMB 1-3 
million), as in the U.S hedge fund industry, this 
implies that only the wealthy can take advantage 
of the governement guarantee, while the even-
tual losses of LGFV would be socialized. Bank 
of China CEO Xiao Gang, writing in the China 
Daily (12 october 2012) criticized the common 
practice of relying on a non transparent capital 
pool to manage Wealth Management Products 
(WMP), reserved for individuals with certain 
minimum deposit balances, which are essentially 
the informal securitization of bank-assets into a 
second balance sheet. As the banks or brokers do 
not provide guarantees for the payment of inter-
est or principal, he accused them of « running a 
Ponzi scheme»60.
Shadow banking would appear to be a positive 
force, in a system dominated by state-owned 
banks lending to SOEs because it provides access 
to credit for labor-intensive SMEs that have dif-
ficulties getting bank loans. However, Charlene 
Chu who has followed Chinese banks for a long 
time, considers that its expansion in 2013 to about 
half of all new credit, is worrisome, as many of the 
credit decisions are driven by relationships with 
59. Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, « Lending in the dark », 
Project Syndicate, 22 April 2013. 
60. Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy Chen ( 2013), article cited, 
p. 22 et 3.
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heavy political influence, in the context of tre-
mendous confidence in the ability and the will-
ingness of the CCP to bail everyone out61.
At the end of 2012, banks had an exposure of 14 
percent of their loans to LGFV and 6 percent to 
property developers, which is manageable, since 
their non performing loan ratio is only 1.2 per-
cent. But the problem comes from Wealth Man-
agement Products, apparently inspired by the U.S 
Credit Risk Transfer products (CRT), that banks 
sell to retail investors. According to CBRC, the 
amount of these short-term instruments (with an 
average time period of less than one year) soared 
to RMB 7.1 trillion at the end of 2012, 7.4 per-
cent of bank deposits. Some of these funds are 
used in long-term projects such as infrastructure 
and property operations. And new WMPs are 
now issued to fill the gap left by expiring ones, 
which is equivalent to financial cavalry. Many 
WMPs are linked to stocks, bonds, exchange 
rates, and about 36 percent of them are related 
to trusts. With the tightening of bank lending 
control at the end of 2010, property developers 
and LGFV turned to the bond market and Trust 
companies, opened to high net-worth individu-
als and professional investors. Trust companies 
quickly became the second largest group of non 
bank financial institutions. Their assets under 
management rose six fold to RMB 7 trillion from 
2008 to 2012, bypassing the insurance (6.9 tril-
lion) and the mutual funds (2.9 trillion) sectors. 
In other words, the low non-performing loans of 
banks are linked to the capacity of WMPs and 
Trust companies to provide new loans to LGVF 
and property developers, which are largely used 
to pay off old debts62. 
The exact amount of local government and 
LGVF debt has led to different estimates rang-
ing, in 2010, from 10.7 trillion (State Auditing 
Office) to 14.7 trillion (Central Bank). In 2013, 
the conclusions of another auditing report are 
expected for October, but the best guess, based 
on grassroots surveys, is around 40 to 60 billion 
RMB, or 40 to 60 percent of GDP63. 
In June-July 2013, the central bank decided to 
tighten short-term credit on the interbank mar-
ket to control the expansion of credit in shadow 
banking. This move revealed the stresses in the 
61. Goldman Sachs, Top of Mind, cited, p. 4.
62. Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy Chen (2013), art. cited, p. 19-20.
63. Yifan Hu, September 3rd, 2013.
financial system, since without intervention from 
the PBOC, the 7 day interbank rate had risen as 
high as 20-30 percent before the PBOC stated its 
intention to maintain sufficient liquidity thereby 
calming the markets. This episode attracted atten-
tion to the fragility of the financial system, which 
is directly linked to the LGFV and developers’ 
balance sheets. 
In fact, as early as 2009, in more than nine prov-
inces, the interest-bearing debt of LGVF was 
twice that of local governements revenues, nota-
bly in Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing. But since 
these liabilities are off-balance sheet, the local 
governments have had to resort to off-budget 
revenues to pay for them. And as the land trans-
fer fees are the most important off-budget rev-
enues of local governements, just sufficient to 
cover their annual interest payments, the liquidity 
and solvency of local government finances, and more 
generally the financial stability of China, are directly 
linked to fluctuations in land markets64. LGVF are 
directly tied to real estate developers. If the real 
estate market cools, developers are going to shy 
away from land sales and LGVF will face financ-
ing problems65.
Growth or financial 
stability: a political 
economy equation
As the stress-test of June, 2013 has shown, finan-
cial stability has become the priority of govern-
ment policy. Growth slowdown due to the tigh-
tening of credit and the desire to deleverage is 
imperative to reduce financial risks. Maintaining 
high rates of growth to improve social mobility 
is no longer a necessity since the labor market 
remains tight and employment is no longer a big 
issue. But the deleveraging process, which may 
cyclically further the slowdown process, cannot 
be efficient if is not backed up by a package of 
institutional and economic reforms aiming at the 
main beneficiaries of credit growth – high-leverage 
local governments, well-connected real-estate 
developers and State-Owned Enterprises, espe-
cially at the central level, under SASAC. 
As Minxin Pei emphasizes, slower credit growth 
necessarily undermines elite unity : « The current 
64. Yang He and Joyce Yanyun Man, « The Debt Magnitude 
and Insolvency Risk of Local Financing Platforms in China », 
Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012, p. 8.
65. Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy Chen (2013), article cited, p.  21.
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Chinese system is a gigantic rent-distributing 
mechanism. The ruling elites have learned to live 
with each other not through shared beliefs, values 
or rules, but by carving up the spoils of economic 
development. In a high growth environment, 
each group or individual could count on getting a 
lucrative contract or project. When growth falters, 
the food fight among party members will become 
vicious66.» Viewed in other terms, the capacity of 
the Xi Jinping/ Li Keqiang tandem to redistribute 
the lion’s share and to resist powerful lobbies by 
launching a much needed structural reform pack-
age will decide their political future, at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Com-
mittee, in November 2013. The structural reform 
package concerns the functional transformation 
of local governments, land use, financial interme-
diation, S0E monopolies, the household regis-
tration system, and the promotion of innovation 
and qualitative growth. As the CCP’s legitimacy 
in urban areas is largely dependent on continued 
improvement in living standards, a halt or even 
a slowdown in improving living standards could 
seriously erode it67. 
On the financial and economic front, the situ-
ation is not so rosy in 2013, despite the central 
government’s ability to manœuvre by selling off 
local government assets and restructuring exist-
ing debts via the big four Asset Management 
Companies which have efficiently managed since 
1999 the huge (40-50 percent) non-performing 
loans made by the banking system. Beijing could 
also provide direct support to local governments 
with proceeds from issuing treasury notes, or 
long-term measures such as the levy of a prop-
erty tax, which accounts for a third of total tax 
revenues for state and local governments in the 
US in 201168. 
The divergence in growth rate between credit (20 
percent) and GDP (7.6) remains worrisome, as 
well as the huge growth of real estate investments 
in the second quarter, outpacing GDP growth by 
12 percentage points69. Given persistent reports 
66. Minxin Pei, « The politics of a slowing China », Project 
Syndicate, 6 july 2013.
67. Yang Zhong and Yongguo Chen, « Regime support in Ur-
ban China », Asian Survey, Vol. 53, N°2, March-April 2013.
68. Yifan Hu, PIIE, september 3rd, 2013. AMC have well 
managed the non performing loans ratio of state banks, 
which fell from 40-50 percent in 1997 to 1.8 percent in 2009 
(Bulletin Économique Chine), August 2009, p. 4.
69. Nicolas Borst, «  China Rebalancing Update  », PIIE, 
August 6th, 2013. Contrary to the real estate investment, 
of excess housing stock70, it is clear that the race 
for land and the real estate bubble continue and 
serve to clear the intertwined debts of LGFV and 
property developers. At the bimonthly session 
of the National Congress Standing Committee, 
it was announced that in the first seven-months 
of 2013, the revenue generated from land-sales 
registered a 49.4 percent increase over the pre-
vious year. The Ministry of Land and Resources 
noted, in a March 2013 report, that second- and 
third-tier cities increased their supply of land for 
housing construction by 30 percent, in 2012, in 
comparison to the average annual supply over 
the previous five years. And at the national level 
in terms of volume, according to a Beijing based 
property research firm, a total of 121 million sq 
metres of residential land was put up for sale dur-
ing the first quarter of 2013, up 22 percent over 
the previous year71. The property market is heat-
ing up again in Beijing, where new home prices 
rose 21 percent over the previous year in August 
2013, nearly double the national average increase 
of 11 percent, according to an index provided 
by professionals. And Sunac China acquired a 
28,168 square meter site, in one of Beijing’s big-
ger urban green spaces, between Sanlitun and 
Chaoyang park, for RMB 2.1 bn (US $ 343 mil-
lion). Including a commitment to build addi-
tional facilities at a separate site, the total price 
amounts to RMB 73.000 (US $ 1196) per square 
meter of buildable space, the most ever paid for a 
piece of land in China72. 
In short, China’s rapid urbanisation policy is now 
diverted to pursue the traditional supply side 
growth model, which assumes that infrastruc-
ture investment leads automatically to demand 
growth, without taking into account its economic 
as well as social costs73 stemming from rising 
discontent over property prices for citizens and 
forceful requisition of land for peasants. The cen-
the growth rate of total enterprise loans and loans to SME’s 
continued to slow in the second quarter.
70. According to Yu Yongding, « with per capita income at 
less than $ 6000, homeownership in China is roughly 90 per-
cent, compared to less than 70 percent in the United States 
Five of the ten tallest skyscrapers under construction world-
wide are in China  China’s economy is being held hostage by 
real estate investment », Project Syndicate, 7 October 2013.
71. « Chinese lawmakers call for innovation-driven growth », 
Xinhua, 29/08/2013 ; « China Hand : Land and Property », 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, August 16th, 2013.
72. Financial Times, September 5th, 2013.
73. Michal Pettis, « The urbanization fallacy », August 16, 2013.
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tral government has for the time being decided 
in favour of growth, with the rising risk of a debt 
trap, where new money is used to pay off old 
debts74. 
The pyramidal structure of debts is linked to the 
power structure. SOEs under SASAC, as well as 
local government leaders, are appointed centrally, 
and until recently their promotion has been based 
largely on the ability to generate high profits or 
GDP growth at the local level, which are them-
selves funded on access to credit and state assets, 
without consideration for efficiency, overcapaci-
ties or overinvestment. 
These considerations are delegated to the central 
government, which is supposed to regulate macro-
economic management, to deal with financial sta-
bility, and to bail every one out in case of problems. 
China’s national balance sheet is estimated, in 
2010, at 142.3 RMB trillion for assets and RMB 
69.6 trillion for liabilities75. In essence, this system 
where power provides access to credit, local author-
ities manage most public expenditures, and the 
central government is supposed to cover all risks, is 
based on a shared irresponsibility. To describe the 
complex relationship between the central and the 
local authorities, one must recall the famous joke 
prevailing in the ex-USSR (« they pretend to pay 
us and we pretend to work »). In China, from the 
perspective of the local authorities, « they pretend 
to command us and we pretend to obey ». In fact, 
since 1978, the saying goes that « the Center has 
its policy ; we have a counter-policy » (中央有正
刺 我们有对刺 Zhongyang you zhengci, women you 
duici). But this central-local dynamic, which has 
always been decisive in Chinese history, is impo-
tent in the face of a potential financial crisis which 
may threaten the whole pyramid of power. 
That is why the capacity to resist powerful lob-
bies is essential at the top. The launch of a long 
term campaign against corruption by Xi Jinping 
is only partly linked to these lobbies in the sense 
that all the arrests or investigations since August 
2013, from former security tsar Zhou Yongkang 
to the powerful SASAC Chairman, Jiang Jiemin, 
seem not only linked to their previous activities 
in the prosperous petroleum industry, but also to 
their political friendship with Bo Xilai, the ex –
governor of Chongqing. His trial in August 2013, 
74. « China’s Rising Risks », The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2013.
75. Li & Zhang 2012, CASS, in Zhiwei Zhang and Wendy 
Chen, (2013), p. 15. 
like the Jiang Jiemin affair, have exposed the lavish 
life of a certain China elite and its offspring, which 
seems directly drawn out of a thriller where crime 
keeps close to mental disorder, luxurious villas on 
the French Riviera, and Ferrari crashes on Beijing’s 
Ring Roads76. It seems dubious that the muddy 
waters of such chronicles will enhance the political 
legitimacy of the present leadership, even if annual 
spending on vehicles, receptions and overseas trips, 
which often accounts for 20 to 30 percent of total 
government spending, is drastically reduced77. 
At the other end of the social spectrum, one of 
the most delicate challenges of the deleveraging 
process is to find ways to reconcile the growth of 
disposible income and increase in real returns on 
bank deposits without imperiling banks, and to 
slow down real estate investment without a col-
lapse of GDP growth78. One of the tools of this 
policy is to apply the anti-monopoly law and to 
ensure full competition in the private game pre-
serve of SOEs. On the radar of future investiga-
tion by the National Development and Reform 
Commission are the petroleum, telecommunica-
tions, banking and automobile sectors79. Thus, the 
financial sector, tightly linked with the land issue, 
has become the main focus of growing conflicts 
of income distribution through the allocation of 
credit and assets. 
In short, the end of cheap China, with the under-
pricing of labor, capital, industrial land and cur-
rency, signals the end of the high growth period. 
The priority is now to reconcile growth and finan-
cial stability in a difficult and political risky devel-
eraging process, since the lion’s share of China’s 
economic and political elite is in question. If the 
rate of growth keeps slowing, it has to be linked 
with sufficient employment and rising household 
income (especially median income), as underlined 
by Premier Li Keqiang, in order to restructure the 
economy in favor of consumption80. But in the 
short term, the necessary reduction of investment 
will put pressure on employment and household 
income growth, except if there is a significant 
transfer of resources from the state and real estate 
76. Financial Times, August 23, 2013, September 2, 2013 ; 
South China Morning Post, 30/08/13, 02/09/2013.
77. Yifan Hu, PIIE, September 3rd, 2013.
78. Nicolas Borst, PIIE, August 6th, 2013.
79. «  China investigate monopolies to safeguard market 
competititon », Xinhua, 21/08/2013. 
80. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang speech at Summer Davos 
meeting in Dalian, Xinhua, 11/09/2013.
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sectors to households81. China is thus on the eve 
of a crucial turning point for the next few years, as 
the postponement of problems by the real estate 
bubble has done nothing but worsen the situation.
81. Michael Pettis, Financial Times, 28 June 2013. 
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